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Abstract:  
This article examines the weaknesses of liberal planning institutions when dealing with 
organised group action.  The case under review, Kiryat-Ha’Yovel neighborhood in 
Jerusalem, was considered as secular for many years. In 2000, the neighborhood 
became attractive to the nearby Haredi (ultra-orthodox Jews) group of the "Kol-Torah" 
community. Differences in life-style led to a collision between the group of "Kol-Torah", 
who began Haredification processes to change character of the area, and the veteran 
population, who tried to prevent it. Identifying the main engines of organised 
neighbourhood change and evaluating the difficulties of liberalism dealing with non-
autonomous individuals in the housing market sheds light on similar processes occurring 
in other city centres with diverse population groups.  
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Introduction 
Urban planning developed during the twentieth century under conditions of strong 
national welfare states, with a relatively weak civil society (Davies, 2001). The need to 
protect the public interest and guarantee its rights led to the establishment of a 
hierarchical system that intervenes in local planning policy throughout the developed 
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world. Influenced by distinct local culture and norms, the liberal mechanism was 
designed to guarantee equality in the allocation of resources and appropriate standard of 
infrastructure for the various sectors (Dean, 2011). According to Healey (1997), planning 
is a social process built up from the particular social relations of a place: "interrelation of 
planning practices with 'formal’ government and with business and social life... made the 
planning is not just a response to problems, but has the potential actively to shape the 
ongoing flow of events and attitudes" (Ibid). In urban reality, the main key actors in the 
planning process - planners and politicians - had to cope with interest groups 
characterised by diverse institutional structures, access to resources, and holding 
inconsistent territorial interests (Taylor 1998). A particular challenge to the liberal 
planning system is posed by groups committed to non-liberal laws and concepts, such 
us the Haredi Jews in Israel. 
 
Haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jews define themselves in terms of their commitment to Halacha, 
the collective body of Jewish religious law that shape both individual daily life and the 
public space (Friedman, 1991). Unifying forces that motivate the Haredim to congregate 
and carry out most of their interactions within their own group, combined with separatist 
forces that cause them to segregate themselves from their surrounding society, have led 
to self-imposed concentrations of the Haredim in enclaves around the world (Valins, 
2003). Spatial congregation reflects Haredi communalism, which is characterised by 
mutual support and a complex system of social and consumer services unique to that 
community. For the group's members, belonging to the group's territory reduces conflicts 
arising from contact with the modern world, strengthens social exchanges, and 
encourages cultural partnership. As to the leadership, spatial dispersal has ramifications 
for management and preservation of the community. Territorial concentrations of sect 
members facilitates control of lives and allows the leadership to maintain social 
dominance within a defined area (Waterman & Kosmin, 1988). In Israel, demographic, 
social, and economic features have increased the growing pressure of the Haredi 
population in urban space in recent decades. As a result, flat  prices in the Haredi 
enclaves are significantly higher than those of similar flats among the general 
population, indicating the importance of living among ‘friends’ for the Haredim. This  
pressure on the enclaves has increased, creating processes of cultural and social 
introversion and territorial spread into non-Haredi areas (Shilhav, 1993). 
 
Most researchers attribute these processes to a range of social, economic, and political 
factors and prefer ‘soft’ terms such as ‘segregation’, rather than explicit reference to 
fundamentalism in the urban space (Aran, Stadler, & Ben-Ari, 2008). Therefore, along 
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with the extensive research literature that deals with collective behaviour as a social 
phenomenon, there is a conspicuous dearth of research dealing with the effect of group 
action on territoriality and the re-shaping of neighbourhoods – evidence of the 
complexity and elusiveness of the subject (Granovetter, 1978). This paper’s contention, 
rather, is that in order to examine these processes, one must refer to the social system 
that drives the local process and the set of values from which it draws its strength. 
Although the Haredi ideology and its evolution into the present collectivist structure is 
often portrayed as having fundamentalist features (Almond, Appleby & Sivan, 1995), this 
paper will examine the collective features of the referred groups and its urban 
expression in Jerusalem. 
 
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, it has been subject to fundamental conflicts, 
with Jerusalem at its epicenter. Other than the regional geopolitical conflict, the city is 
sacred to the three main monotheistic religions, thus inviting inevitable global tensions. 
The city has been associated with the primary social clashes in Israeli society, between 
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs (Sharkansky, 1996), between Sephardim (Jews from 
neighboring Arab countries) and Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin) and between 
Haredi and secular Jews. Jerusalem is populated by 801,000 residents, of which 62% 
are Jews, Muslims comprise 35%, Christians around 2% and 1% not classified by 
religion. The Jewish residents are overwhelmingly religious, with only 21% secular. The 
“Haredification” of Jerusalem [process whereby non-Haredim populations are replaced 
by Haredim] can be linked to every aspect of life and decision making in the city 
(Hasson, 1996). 
 
The urban planning in West Jerusalem preserved the liberal trend of the first few years 
following the founding of the state of Israel, to unite various population groups for the 
creation of a common Israeli culture (ibid, 1996). According to this view, the Haredi 
community had not been considered as a singular one which required a special urban 
space, but instead as part of the wider Israeli melting pot. Consequently, the Haredi 
territory has been restricted by land uses which contradict its nature and every contact 
bears the seeds of a territorial struggle with neighboring populations over living space 
(Shilhav & Friedman, 1985). High population density and increased prices for 
apartments in Haredim enclaves has motivated a constant migration of population from 
the Haredim enclaves. “Haredified” neighborhoods have two key characteristics: 
proximity to an existing Haredi congregation; and a location close to inner-city 
neighbourhoods (Hasson, 1996). Influx of Haredim into secular neighbourhoods has 
caused friction and bitter struggles over the city's character.  
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The Kiryat-Ha’Yovel neighborhood of Jerusalem is an interesting case study which can 
be used to examine important elements in the ability of a cohesive community to 
harness private interests in order to wrest control of space from other groups, thereby 
creating a 'contiguous' Haredi living space. This paper examines how interest groups 
holding different values adopt strategies to claim territory, identified the relationship 
between the individual and his/her group, while also considering the role of liberal 
planning in the conflict. 
 
Theoretical background 
People, the actors in the urban space, shape the built environment in ways that reflect 
their lifestyle, culture and values. Urban structure results from various levels of 
cooperation emerging between relatively free individuals (Wirth, 1956). Indirect 
cooperation reflects similarities in the way people ‘read’ and interpret urban space, and 
direct cooperation reflects economic interests and social organisation (Fischer, 1982). In 
recent decades, with the dissolution of the social, economic, and political frameworks 
that constitute the background for planning, the impact and the pressure of direct 
cooperation of interest groups on urban space has considerably increased (Alexander, 
2002; Kolossov, 2005). The difficulties of liberal planning to implement its agenda and 
regulate resources between groups and individuals will be discussed in this paper: In 
order to explain the way individuals incline towards and cooperate with groups, including 
local resident associations that motivate residential dynamics and actions, the research 
will use the themes of interest groups and Group behaviour in the urban space. The 
theme of territoriality and re-shaping neighborhoods will elaborate the way different 
groups adopts different strategies to claim space. 
 
‘Interests’ are defined as motivations for action which affect social behaviour, judgment 
and choices, and the aim of an 'interest group' is to influence public opinion and/or policy 
(Miller 1999). Interest groups vary in size and institutional structure, their organisation, 
access to authorities, motives and sources of funding; some have wide ranging long 
term social purposes, others are focused and are a response to an immediate issue or 
concern. Some are supported by powerful businesses or political interests and exert 
considerable influence on the political process, others have few such resources (Stone & 
Salisbury, 1969; Denzau & Munger 1986; Hendricks 2006). In the classification of 
interest groups, it is common to distinguish between public-interest, which is conceived 
as a value commitment to benefit the whole public, and private-interest, which 
represents the values of western individualistic culture and can be assigned also to 
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groups and collectives (Funk 2000). Likewise, although the institutional structure of the 
groups, their organisation, access to authorities and sources of funding allows us to 
categorise them according to their type of interest group (Drezon-Tepler, 1990), these 
terms are also not absolute. Hence, the research will examine how interest groups 
characterised by different levels of cooperation between the individual and his group, 
affects the residential structure. 
 
The effect of cooperation between a city's free individuals on its urban structure was 
considered, for example, by the Chicago School at the beginning of the 20th century. 
According to their "invasion-succession” theory (Park, 1936) and its more updated 
explanation (Hawley, 1950), spatial competition between groups is an ecological process 
which enables us to describe collective behavior. In the absence of clear behavioral 
norms, spontaneous social gathering is the means to improve an individual’s ability to 
cope with the challenges of urban life. As these mechanisms are influenced by living 
costs, areas with different resources specialise in ways which give them a competitive 
advantage over other regions (Blumer, 1951). Over time, the original population leave 
and the area changes. 
 
As opposed to indirect collaboration, collectivist behavior, which is driven by a clear 
leadership in a given place and time, is defined as group behavior (Saegert & Winkel, 
1990). Authority reaches consensus, defines rules and creates an organised segregated 
pattern (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). This behaviour, characterising organised groups as 
Group purchasing organisation and Gated Communities, is relevant to explain business 
practice like racial blockbusting in American cities during the 60's and 70's (Mehlhorn, 
1998), and is particularly strong among traditional communities (Bankston & Zhou, 
1995). Many of these communities attempt to revive old traditional lifestyles by using 
modern fundamentalist mechanisms that reinforce a compliance due to identification - 
different from compliance out of fear or under explicit threat. Both individuals who 
choose to be accepted into the group as well as individuals who born into it develop their 
identity under social pressure (Castells, 1997), usually around a charismatic leader who 
translates concepts and ideas from the scriptures into practical behaviours. An 
individual’s needs become congruent with the group’s interests, and the individual’s 
welfare aspect is judged by his status within the group and his contribution to the 
community (Ammerman, 1987). As part of the community, individuals are expected to 
concede their free will and to subordinate their interests to those of the group, even in 
cases where they are indifferent or even harmed by them (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
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At times the asymmetrical balance of power between neighboring communities creates 
group violence (Boal, 2008). When the group members realize they are more likely to 
achieve their goal when acting coordinately and simultaneously, they may consolidate 
under a well-defined authority and use their enclave as a base for group action. In this 
behaviour, previously described in conflictual cities, such as Belfast, Nicosia or Sarajevo, 
the authority will use its access to capital - whether financial or knowledge based – to 
claim the territory for themselves and expand it by forcing out everybody they deem not 
belonging (Gottman, 1973; Malmberg, 1980; Sack, 1983). Thus, long-term structural and 
symbolic acts of group violence against a religious minority in Ahmedabad transformed 
mixed Hindu and Muslim working-class neighborhoods into a patchwork of mono-
religious localities, with the meeting points between these areas referred to as “borders” 
(Desai, 2007). Whether these borders are gateways or barriers, weak or strong (Paasi, 
1996; Donnan 2006: 2), rigid or flexible, highly populated or virtually empty (Altvater, 
1998, Newman, 2003), or even gray spaces tolerated quietly (Yiftachel, 2006), they 
display differences of inequality and asymmetry, whether economic, political, cultural or 
social between communities (Giddens, 1984:17, 85). 
 
In the liberal ideology it is only in benighted, backward or pre-modern societies that 
individuals put an unchosen group identity — such as membership of an ethnic group or 
nation — ahead of their interests as individuals. Thus, spatial pattern of ghettoisation, 
segregation and sectarianism that obscure the fundamental interests which humans 
have in common, is considered as outsiders to the civilized liberal world (Ignatieff 1993). 
Planning, in this respect, think in terms of individuals rather than collectivities and seek 
for erosion of ethnic solidarities and weaken the boundaries between groups. Healey 
(1997: 87) explained that "Planning practice is not an innocent, value-neutral activity. It is 
deeply political. It carries value and expresses power. The power lies in the formal 
allocation of rights and responsibilities, in the politics of influence, the practices through 
which ‘bias’ is mobilised, and in the taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in cultural 
practices". Recently, with the growing impact of interest groups on urban space, the 
assumption of liberal planning that democratic institutions, including the market, will 
‘balance’ competing interests in accordance with local needs, has been weakened 
(Bollens 2000; Alfasi, 2014). In the “vibrant” city of Jerusalem, the tolerance of systems 
towards individuals from the private investors and strong interest groups - mainly 
religious groups - involved in planning increased, as well as the temptation for 
corruption. This process emphasised the difficulties of the individualistic orientated 
institutions to deal with the residential behaviour of groups. 
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Jerusalem planning lies on the seam between charting national policy and the pressures 
of diversified urban politics, subjected to the regulatory and hierarchy system of Israeli 
planning. Guidelines go from top to bottom, from the national-level institutions through 
one of six districts - one of them is the Jerusalem District Planning and Building 
Committee - to the local Planning and Building Committees. Main liberal aspects of this 
system is the large number of representative bodies in the committees, which include 
professional representatives of government agencies, municipal authority, environmental 
and the general public; and public participatory that enables the public to bring 
applications to both already created and new plans (Alterman & Gavrieli, 2008). The 
range of views represented in this system reveals a conflict between two normative 
systems, secular and religious, which from the perspective of both of them, behaviour 
according to the second system leads to a law violation. Contrary to secular politicians' 
pragmatic views, where the rule of law exists and is binding but can be taken lightly 
when it is required by political logic (Sprinzak, 1986; Malkin, 2005), scripture and its 
interpretations are also a source of social, economic, and political authority, which 
sometimes increasesd the willingness of Haredim decision-makers to divert public 
resources to the sector they represent (Shilhav, 1998;127). 
 
 
 
Methodology 
The Haredim are reluctant to disclose information that enables authorities and 
researchers to estimate the size of the population. Attempts to gather statistical, 
demographic, or any other information, are impeded because they are not considered as 
an independent category, so quantitative data referring to the population is likely to be 
based on estimate, assessment, or survey.  
This study is based on "real data", provided anonymously by the people themselves in 
2009 at the level of single apartment, section, and building. First, all 653 buildings in 
Kiryat-Ha’Yovel were surveyed. In each building/section, representatives of the building 
committee or the long-standing residents were asked about the identity of the residents 
of the building, and whether they rented or owned their apartment. From the data 
collected in this manner, a map of the population distribution was created, from which a 
secondary map was derived for each discrete population group. The population 
distribution of the Haredi-Lithuanians was particularly marked because it was 
prominently congregated in the large residential buildings on Zangwill Street. In 
consequence, the dynamics of residence on the street was then examined at the 
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individual apartment level. Overall, Zangwill Street contains 347 apartments in nine 
residential buildings with 46 separate entrances.  
Secondly, although co-operation was limited, most of the new residents indicated that 
they belonged to the Haredi-Lithuanian community of Kol-Torah, based in the adjoining 
neighborhood of Bayit-Ve’Gan, and gave date of entry into the new apartment. 
 
To reconstruct the dynamics of population replacement, 246 veteran residents – who 
sold their apartments between 2002-2010 - were identified and interviewed about the 
sale process. They provided information about the price and the month/year of the sale. 
In addition, they were asked about the approximate number of secular families still 
residing in the building at the moment of a sale. Ex-owners were willing to reply to these 
questions in 76% of the cases, and cross-checks with data supplied by real estate 
agencies increased the percentage of cases for which the price and the number of 
secular tenants are both available to 88%. The market price of an apartment at the 
moment of the sale was estimated based on cross-referenced data provided by three 
Kiryat-Ha`Yovel main realtors. They produced information on the population exchange 
and expressed the dynamic processes, making it possible to estimate residential 
markets in the neighborhood.   
The characteristics of all apartments and households were organised as a high-
resolution layer, in which every record is related to its corresponding building. The layer 
was then integrated into the area GIS provided by Jerusalem Municipality. Additional 
layers pertain to topography, roads, land parcels and buildings, updated to 2004. This 
spatial-temporal GIS facilitated investigation of the residential micro-dynamics of 
Zangwill Street while referring to residents’ identities and turnover of apartments and 
spotlighting the group organisation and the leadership rule behind these processes. 
 
In addition, 30 interviews were conducted with key figures from various fields. Those 
involved with the Kol-Torah community were interviewed about spatial relations between 
the individual and the community, and the economic aspect of the yeshiva in regard to 
housing. Functionaries in Jerusalem Municipality were interviewed regarding the 
capabilities and limitations of the planning system in the encounter between population 
groups. Residents from various population groups and members of the secular “Action 
Committee to Preserve the Character of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel” were interviewed about 
activities in the public and private space. The information was cross-checked with blogs, 
articles, and Haredi internet sites, which offered a range of different types of knowledge 
and perspectives on their communities. Observing these conflicts in Kiryat-Ha’Yovel will 
enable us to explain the idea of “Terrain of interests". 
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The Haredi in Jerusalem 
The Haredi population is distinguished by internal, nuanced distinctions among its sub-
sects, expressed in different values and normative behavior. Common to all is the great 
importance given to their holy studies, which is expressed in an individual's social status: 
a "scholar" who invests and succeeds in his holy studies gains a high social status 
(Gonen, 2006). This phenomenon prevails mainly in the Israeli-Lithuanian Haredi 
community and reinforces an individual’s solidarity with the community’s values, limiting 
their economic development (Friedman, 1991). However, despite the economic status of 
most of the individual members tending to be very low, the economic power of the 
Haredi community as a whole is considerable: many communities maintain financial 
resources and services composed of donations and taxpayer money through state 
support for religious institutions (Hasson, 1996).  
 
The increase of the strength of the Haredi communities has become highly important 
when socio-economic issues, such as marrying young and high fertility rates – some 6% 
annually – (Berman and Klinov, 1997) exacerbate the growing pressure of the Haredi 
population on urban space. The solution proposed by the State of Israel is to allocate 
land for constructing Haredi neighborhoods. This development, which began in the 
1960s, accelerated in the 1980s with the construction of new neighborhoods and cities 
to accommodate Haredi populations unable to solve their housing problems in the free 
market (Gonen, 2006). However, despite the state’s involvement, official solutions were 
inadequate for meeting the demand. As a result, Haredi pressure on the enclaves 
increased, creating processes of cultural and social introversion and territorial spread 
accompanied by the exclusion of the existing local population (Feitelson, 2011). Shilhav 
(1998: 127) explains that the strength of the Haredim in national and local politics has 
increased the willingness of Haredi decision-makers to cultivate Haredi social-spatial-
cultural segregation: "Haredim adopt modes of operation and ‘rules of the game’ that are 
quasi-universal, but their real aims remain particularistic”. Thus, local authorities often 
provide the necessary regulation for maintaining the Haredi public space; including 
setting Eruv wires; a ritual enclosure to make the area a ‘private domain’ (a concept in 
Jewish law which makes it permissible to carry objects on the Sabbath), closing streets 
for traffic on Saturdays and allocating buildings for religious services. 
 
In the Haredi society, the Israeli-Lithuanians are considered a religious elite, and thus 
set the norms for Haredi world (Gonen, 2006). The individual identities of Israeli-
Lithuanians are defined at all levels, classified by their rabbinical figures and yeshivas 
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(higher education institutes), which are all subject to hierarchical leadership (Friedman, 
1991). An individual’s life is centered on the Yeshiva, an institution of higher religious 
studies that also provides social services, including children's education and basic 
welfare. The government provides stipends to the study institutions directly, but these 
funds are fully regulated and distributed by the Rabbis exclusively: small living stipends 
are given to each Torah student family (Gonen, 2006). The community’s leaders 
regulate a system of control and supervision, creating dependency of the individual on 
his community. Nowadays, when housing enhancers and young families have difficulties 
realising their preferences to live within their own community, the importance of group 
behaviour has increased. This is particularly relevant to the Israeli-Lithuanian Haredi 
community of Kol-Torah, interested in creating territorial continuity in Kiryat-Ha’Yovel 
neighbourhood in Jerusalem. 
 
The case study: Kiryat-Ha`Yovel  
In 2009, the population of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel, in south-west Jerusalem (Fig. 1), comprised 
about 17,500, inhabiting 653 residential buildings with 6428 apartments (Picture 1). 
Originally, most of the apartments in the street were about the same size – 48-55 sq. m. 
(2.5 rooms), though some of them were enlarged. The neighbourhood was populated by 
a secular population, along with National-Religious and Haredi populations, including 
members of the Sephardic sects, the Chabad-Hassidic community, and Lithuanian sub-
sects classified by national origin: Israeli, American, French and Sephardi-Lithuanian 
(Table 1). Each sub-sect has its own community institutions and generally did not marry 
outside its own group.  
 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
 
[Place Picture 1 about here] 
 
[Place Table 1 about here] 
 
In recent years, Israeli-Lithuanians of Kol-Torah have been purchasing apartments on 
Zangwill Street, the northeastern boundary of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel (Fig. 2). This Yeshiva was 
founded in 1939 by German immigrants who arrived in Israel following the ‘Kristallnacht’ 
pogrom, and although its scholarly trend was not initially a militant ultra-orthodox, it 
changed over the years. Today Kol-Torah is considered one of the most important 
yeshivas of the Torah world, and the secular and the national-religious residents of 
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Kiryat-Ha’Yovel are concerned about its impact on the public spaces, and its possible 
ramifications. 
 
[Place Figure 2 about here] 
 
“Terrain of interests" between Haredi and secular in Kiryat-Ha’Yovel 
Interests between the individual and his group 
The Haredi community of Kol-Torah 
In recent years, demographic, social, and economic pressures have limited involvement 
of the leadership in the community’s daily life, and its ability to enforce group discipline 
for continued residence within the community has been weakened. By default, the 
leftovers are driven to establish residence far from the original group enclave. The 
geographic isolation that is created between the generations threatens the continuity of 
the community: on the one hand, the population living in the original enclave is aging, 
and on the other, the lifestyle in the new communities tends to adapt itself to the new 
conditions of life (Shilhav, 1993). Interviews with key figures in the community, such as 
Ben-Porat, Y., a local politician (Feb. 26, 2010), Carmel, M., Head of Degel-Hatorah 
building association (March 1, 2010) and Itzkovitz, S., an advertising promoter of the 
Lithuanian group (March 1, 2010), revealed that these processes which were a source of  
concern for the leaders of the “Kol- Torah” community from the Bayit-Va’Gan 
neighbourhood, motivated Rabbis Elyashiv and Auerbach to encourage group action to 
expand the original living space of the group. 
An individual’s identification with their community and their desire to raise their children 
in a homogeneous religious environment evokes conscious ideological and moral 
recruitment. Clear-cut monitory mechanisms ensure compliant behaviour, allowing the 
leadership to impose discipline and organise matters in accordance with its preferences. 
The expressive incentive for the group’s members is that they would help out in the 
process of trying to obtain the group's goals. Libskind B., director of Kol-Torah yeshivas 
1987-2011, asserts: “When the students cooperated, we were able to build new 
educational departments, attract new pupils, and enlarge the community’s area. That 
way we all benefited” (October 17, 2011). The private-interest group of Kol-Torah is 
characterised by a well-coordinated institutional structure, organized funding and 
members’ strong commitment, which enabled them to mobilise dedicated manpower and 
significant resources to realize the community’s segregated preferences.  
 
The non-Haredi population of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel 
 The individuals’ population of Zangwill Street  
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The mixed population comprised of individuals with diverse beliefs and interests. Most of 
them were secular Jews, mainly autonomous homeowners. Confronting the new 
incomers, who were backed by capital and group support, the veteran residents had no 
community support.  
The direct cooperation of the Haredim with their community created pressure on the 
residents, who were exposed to limitations such as restrictions on traffic on the Sabbath 
and holidays. This aroused anger and infringes upon the secular lifestyle. Avi Nai’m, a 
former resident, explains: “Their entry into our street means that we cannot go on living 
as we used to. All of our rights were trampled. They commented about our clothes, 
sprayed clothes hanging on the clotheslines, threw rocks when we drove on the 
Sabbath, hung signs in the building about “Passage only in modest dress”; 
advertisements with women’s faces were vandalized”. Ultimately, most of the veteran 
residents preferred to sell their apartments to the Haredim and leave, causing a fall in 
prices and an accelerated re-population. 
 
 The “Action Committee to Preserve the Character of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel”  
Organized secular efforts began in August 2008, when haredification was at its height. 
 Activities for establishing a cluster of Haredi kindergartens on a lot originally designated 
as the site for establishing a memorial for fallen soldiers from the neighborhood violated 
the Secular-Haredi status quo. These acts, carried out with no building permit at the 
instruction of Deputy-Mayor Pollak, outraged many of the secular residents. Some 
secular residents then decided to establish a voluntary group - the ‘Action Committee to 
Preserve the Character of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel’. Gilboa R., one of the main activists, claimed 
“Beyond our concern about the threat to the character of the neighborhood, members of 
the committee expressed the disappointment of the non-Haredi residents of Jerusalem 
who were seeing entire neighborhoods, like Ramat-Eshkol and Ma’alot-Daphna in 
northern Jerusalem, become Haredi. Apart from the sense of urgency and the desire to 
protect our homes from haredification, was the sense of being abandoned by the city 
authorities” (March 24, 2010). This fed the spirit of opposition and powered the initiative 
to turn Kiryat-Ha’Yovel into a symbol of blocking the process (Nahum-Halevi, 2009).  
As an instant and random interest group, whose members regarded themselves as 
independent actors free to pursue individual interests, the secular residents were united 
in their aspiration to the right to freedom of expression – to travel and/or conduct 
consumer and cultural activities on the Sabbath and Jewish holidays. In counterbalance, 
their demands that the authorities defend “their rights” and stop sectarian allocations of 
public resources produced debate over their real dedication to mixed neighborhoods. 
Lack of consensus about values, modes of action, leadership and vested interests 
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together with poor organisation and coordination deterred many people from acting. 
Apart from some 15-20 central figures, mainly white-collar citizens, most registered 
members only acted on a short-term basis or in a specific project. 
 
Organisation in housing 
 The effects of Group Action of  ”Kol-Torah“ Community 
 The emergence of an internal housing market in Zangwill Street 
In order to understand how group action works, this research examined the rapid 
occupation of Zangwill Street by Kol-Torah Israeli-Lithuanians between 2002 and 2009 
(Fig. 3). The rapid process indicates the abilities of an organised community when it 
competes with non-organized individuals. The first step was critical for the success of 
the haredification. Figure 4 illustrates the two stages in the group’s penetration:   
1. Lone pioneers identify apartments for sale and enter them gradually (2002–
2004).  
2. Massive penetration turns a ‘non-hostile’ into ‘friendly’ area (2005–2007). The 
rapid movement patterns were well-planned. The designated area was marked by the 
leaders of the community. In 2002, three Lithuanian families purchased apartments in 
different housing projects. By 2004 a few Lithuanian families were living in Zangwill 
Street. Pre-planning was evident in the acquisition of apartments in the same cluster of 
buildings (but not in the same section). 
 
[Place Figure 3 about here] 
 
[Place Figure 4 about here] 
 
Data obtained from local estate agents (Bunin, E. May 14, 2009; David, A. May 11, 
2009; Stern, S. May 14, 2009; Sternberg, C. May 17, 2009) and former residents 
enabled reconstruction of the gradient of prices and an examination of the market 
dynamic as of 2002: 
1. Penetration: two apartments purchased by Lithuanians above market price.  
2. Before “tie-break”: apartments 3 and 4 purchased below market price.  
3. Emergence of an internal-market: Zangwill Street becomes identified with Israeli-
Lithuanian population. Apartments switch hands rapidly, from secular population to 
Israeli-Lithuanian. Prices inside the community territory rise again, creating a property 
line around/within its boundaries. According to realtors, the community organisation 
provided financial support to the Kol-Torah “spearhead”. The first secular residents to 
sell their apartments received approximately 20% more than the market price.  
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Until 2005, some 35% of the purchased apartments were randomly distributed between 
the buildings. As the number of Kol-Torah inhabitants increased, prices declined and 
even fell below market level, but when the street became more popularly accepted, 
prices rose again (Fig. 5).  
 
[Place Figure 5 about here] 
 
The realtor Shlomo Stern described how processes within the Kol-Torah community 
affected prices: “When an area is designated as Lithuanian, demand increases. People 
fear that apartments will be ‘snapped up’, and that they will lose the opportunity to live 
among friends, so that they must wait for another area to be “koshered”, perhaps farther 
away. This causes housing prices to rise. The market which drives the price rise here is 
not secular or mixed, but within the Lithuanian community itself. So ultimately the buyer 
is the one who receives more from the community’s funds”.  
 
As of 2006, Haredi direct collaborations has succeeded in strengthening the Haredim 
presence on Zangwill Street. Group actions motivated by ideological practices expanded 
the group's territory while segregating the group from other Haredim and the veteran 
population of the neighborhood, creating a homogeneous housing pattern. Today, the 
Kol-Torah community has succeeded in wresting control of Zangwill Street and almost 
all the 347 families belong to the community. Single apartments that still belong to 
secular residents are either publicly owned or business locations (i.e. a dental clinic). 
The borders' results from Kol-Torah's group action for expansion of the community 
territory are clear and defined, displaying asymmetry between communities: while the 
outsiders non-Haredi are varied and non-organized, the insiders Haredi are present in 
unified traditional garb in the public areas. 
 
 From the spearhead of Zangwill Street to other parts of the neighborhood 
The entry of the Kol-Torah community into Zangwill Street has led to the entry of other 
Lithuanian-Haredi groups into the neighborhood. Cross-referenced data from residents, 
realtors, blogs and articles from Haredi websites indicate that apart from the Chabad 
community, members of the ‘Pe’er Yakov’, ‘Hevron”, and ‘Tiferet Yisrael’ yeshivas 
infiltrated the neighborhood spontaneously, after and due to the organised Israeli-
Lithuanian invasion . 
 
Goldberg, Y., a former Israeli-Lithuanian who lives in the neighborhood, explained: “This 
neighborhood has already undergone haredificaton. There are few secular people left. 
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For Israeli-Lithuanians, it is totally Haredi” (10 March, 2010). Without communal funding, 
urban processes limit their ability to realise their preferences, and individual decisions 
are open to spatial competition in a free market. Each household is responsible for 
finding its place within the communal space. The non-organszed purchases have 
increased the presence of the Haredim groups throughout the area, yet could not 
guarantee a suitable environment for the individuals to fulfill their community obligations.  
 
Examination of this situation in Behadrey Haredim, the Haredim news website, revealed 
some of the housing purchasers’ considerations: “Based on what I know about the 
neighborhood, there are areas there that cost between $80000 -$100000, but the 
question is which Haredim residents reside in that area?” Another browser answered : "I 
recommend that anyone looking for an apartment in Kiryat-Ha’Yovel, even if he is not 
Lithuanian, not be deterred… Place the educational consideration opposite the financial 
consideration. Will you be able to raise your children here in the next ten years”?. This 
correspondence reveals the doubts among the people who were purchasing apartments 
without any guarantee about the identity of their future neighbors. Thus, even when an 
area is specifically marked out, it is still the individual who must make the investment in 
the face of uncertainty regarding the future character of the area. Hence the areas which 
the Haredim have entered in a non-organised manner- mainly into housing complexes 
on Stern Street, and afterwards to the peripheral streets of the  neighborhood, Hantke 
and Brazil, which have large residential buildings) Fig. 6) - tend to be more 
heterogeneous, populated by members of various communities and sects. 
 
[Place Figure 6 about here] 
 
Attempts of the Action Committee to Provide Obstruction in Private and Public Spaces 
The action committee tried to convince secular residents, at personal financial sacrifice, 
to refrain from selling apartments to Haredim. Mandler, D., a main activist explained: 
“Committee members appealed personally to families advertising apartments for sale, 
and tried to dissuade them. However, many veteran residents acted individually, 
preferring to realize the economic value of their apartments” (May 18, 2009). This 
inability to influence individuals and to dissuade them from selling their apartments also 
limited the committee’s influence on the public space. 
 
The committee then focused on the image of a young, mixed neighborhood, and on 
persuading local authorities to enforce the building laws. In addition to the campaign 
against Eruv wires, the committee organized Friday night cultural activities, a 
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demonstration, a clothing sale, Friday afternoon performances, and summer night film 
screenings, all of which emphasised the heterogeneous identity of the neighborhood and 
its struggle against haredification. The secular presence in the public space was 
intended to indirectly influence residents to refrain from selling their apartments to 
Haredim, and to present a united front to influence the municipal decision-makers. In 
practice, many secular individuals were unable to withstand the pressure of the 
organised group, as well as the fear of being a minority and the daily restrictions, and 
consequently were motivated to leave. 
 
Potential for influencing planning decision making 
Kol-Torah: aim justifies the means  
Deep social and cultural roots as well as strong mutual interests motivated Kol-Torah to 
act in favour of influencing planning decisions, which they deployed for sectorial goals. In 
the past decade, there has been an increase in the number of Israeli-Lithuanians related 
to the Kol-Torah community in key positions on Jerusalem’s City Counci, for instance 
Rabbi Lapolianski served as Mayor of Jerusalem (2003-2008), one of his deputies, 
Rabbi Maklev, held the Construction and Planning Portfolio since 1993, and another 
deputy, Rabbi Pollak, was chairman of the Construction and Planning Committee (2003-
2008). In addition, the Deputy Mayor is currently Rabbi Pindrus. In the context neo-
liberal competitive economy lifestyle, as the number of the group's representatives and 
their influence on legislature increases, their ability to use rights to occupying space and 
claiming resources increases accordingly. 
 
Barkat, the secular mayor of Jerusalem since 2008, explained that the allocation of 
public resources takes place according to the liberal premise: “We should match the 
public resources to the residents’ needs to reduce friction between the various sectors in 
the city” (Shiloh, 2009). However, Bin-Noon A., head of the Municipality’s public building 
division, explained the pressure of the group's representatives: “We were contacted by 
Elyashiv’s people, but we cannot build any more at present, and there is no vacant 
facilities" (May 29, 2008). As public resources are limited, the uncompromising need of 
the Haredi sub-sect for segregated institutes - particularly synagogues and various 
educational institutions around which the community is concentrated - encourage 
activation in contravention of the planning permit. 
 
Rabbi Elyashiv's instruction “Don’t give in even if you break the law” (Katz, 2009) shows 
that in a possible clash between community duties and state law, the commitment to the 
community is higher. The group's members, thus, were encouraged to engage in local 
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politics and even dissociate themselves from Torah in order to achieve their sectorial 
worldly goals, mainly achieved through construct in violation of a permit/without a permit 
and anomalous use/change of designation, such as the establishment of an Eruv, the 
destruction of non-Haredi bulletin boards / advertisements and the throwing of stones on 
the Shabbat day. T. Katz, head of the municipality`s Department of Licensing and 
Supervision, explained that although they were aware of the illegal activity taking place, 
they were powerless to enforce planning laws in the neighborhood: in a built-up area, it 
can be hard to detect zoning violations, and so in the inner city, the subject is neglected. 
If no one reports, the inspectors will not look for violations on their own initiative. They 
cannot know just by visiting an area if there is a violation, unless they crosscheck their 
data with the licensing department, and that is not their job. In any case, because of the 
overload, town planners only manage the urban aspects of civil society, and cases are 
closed due to a lack of public interest (May 29, 2008). 
 
The Action committee:  Minimal achievements  
After a long period in which a member of the Lithuanian group was mayor of Jerusalem, 
the election was won by the secular candidate, and the Action committee hoped to enlist 
him on behalf of their interests: “We wanted the municipality to stop it. To refuse to 
establish sectorial institutions without permits, stop sectarian allocations, and promote 
projects to attract young secular people to the neighborhood" (Mandler, Jan 19, 2010). In 
practice, the election gave rise to a broad coalition of various sectors of the city’s 
population, and the mayor's ability to influence local processes was limited. 
 
The committee refused to accept the renunciation of the authorities from what they saw 
as their role. They demanded that planners intervene in the development of the 
neighbourhood and managed to raise public interest in the policy process. Gilboa 
explains: "We must guarantee that the public resources do not serve separatist groups. 
It is important to act at the level of the municipal decision makers and to bring about the 
closing of 20-30 illegal Haredim institutions operating in the neighborhood". In 
collaboration with the community council, the legal adviser to the municipality, and 
municipal planning institutions, the committee promoted legal action to prevent the 
unlawful allocation of public resources to the Haredim. Although their influence on 
planning was indirect, the main achievements of the veteran population was the initiation 
of an outline plan that provided a comprehensive planning framework for the 
neighborhood and the inclusion of issues of sectarian allocations and illegal activity on 
the public agenda. 
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Despite their achievements, the unorganized group was unable to protect their cultural 
heritage, identity or living space from being taken over. The haredification process 
continues to occupy space, claim resources and affect lifestyle. Although the battle is 
also taking place at the level of the municipality, the office avoided issuing policy 
interventions in the conflict. Bin-Noon explains: "We have no full understanding and no 
ethical value to cope with conflicts between diverse population groups. We are 
powerless to enforce planning laws in the neighborhood and avoid intervening in this 
process". Thus, the impotence of the liberal system to regulate resources and enforce 
planning laws in terrain where sectorial interests clash, lead to the outcome in this case. 
 
Concluding discussion: appropriation of territory- failure of liberalism or all-you-can-grab 
in Planning? 
 
This paper has examined the spatial encounter that is taking place between two interest 
groups struggling over space and resources in the Kiryat-Ha’Yovel neighbourhood in 
Jerusalem. The research has revealed the different strategies they have adopted to 
claim territory, distinguish their abilities and limitations to influence the neighborhoods' 
private and public space, as well as the limitations of the planning system. 
 
In-depth door to door surveys indicated the way direct, effective collaborations of 
individuals of the Kol-Torah community and their leadership led to a gradual 
appropriation of Zangwill Street. Relying on existing community infrastructures of Bayit-
Va’Gan made it possible to concentrate the community in a compact area at relatively 
low cost. This collaboration is surprising in light of the accounts about the limited group 
discipline of the Lithuanian Haredim, and can be largely explained by the attractiveness 
of Kiryat Ha’Yovel, which offers a solution to housing problems within the green line of 
Jerusalem. Including the young families in the community territory has increased the 
community's volume and the prestige of its leaders. 
 
This behaviour, spreading to the large residential buildings on the peripheral streets of 
the neighborhood, demonstrated that the Haredim are effective strategists in planning, 
organising, and executing a homogeneous space that is characterised by its own laws. 
The ’Action Committee to Preserve the Character of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel’ had two 
weaknesses in front of the Haredi group. First, they were not sufficiently sharp and 
effective. They resisted exclusion, but produced it by insisting on applying the term 
“mixed neighborhoods” exclusively to non-Haredi Jews.  One may assume that the 
‘pluralistic populations’ wouldn't wish to coexist also alongside Arab or African 
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communities. Secondly, the interests of individuals contradicted the interests of the 
group, and therefore failed to produce compliance. In the urban reality, the inherent lack 
of collaboration and cohesion in the secular population limited their ability to safeguard 
their spatial rights and maintain their social practices. The spatial predominance of Kol-
Torah increased, and the veteran residents have left the area. 
 
The abilities and limitations of interest groups to claim territory should be combined with 
theories that underestimate the role of different levels of cooperation in operating 
segregation processes. Despite some resemblances, the organised entry into Zangwill 
Street differs from the classic invasion–succession model, according to which relatively 
free individuals move spontaneously into areas of higher-status populations, using 
private capital, and also from a racial blockbusting in US cities, which involved planned 
invasions even if the newcomers weren’t the planners. In Zangwill Street, the group 
action was supported by community capital, organised collaboration and implementation. 
The gradient of prices on Zangwill Street shows a moderate drop in prices and after that 
a rise, in the wake of the formation of an internal market. When the veteran population 
left, there was a sharp decline in prices. Individual cooperation with the group’s action is 
evident in the dramatic increase in housing prices after the “tie-break”. In those cases 
the newcomers created spatial dominance. Kol-Torah dominance compelled Haredi 
groups that entered afterwards to adapt themselves to the patterns they have 
established. Since these areas reflect compromises that were made between the 
preference for segregation and urban constraints, they tended to be more 
heterogeneous than the Israeli-Lithuanians enclaves.  
 
Similar to the shift of ethno-religious boundaries in Indian cities, direct collaboration of 
individuals with their leadership has gradually inserted the cultural language of Kol-Torah 
into Zangwill Street, and re-shaped the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
uses. This has involved property lines, religious composition as well as acts of symbolic 
and everyday violence. Unlike the Indian case, the apartment prices in the Haredi 
enclaves are significantly higher than similar apartments in the area, which has drawn 
the boundaries between identities and provided a particular utility to the larger mission of 
the haredification of Kiryat-Ha’Yovel. 
 
This study contributes two new ideas to the knowledge base of spatial behavior of the 
Haredi population in Israel. The first is the detailed resolution of the process of 
expansion of the Haredi enclave, and the second is ‘terrain of interests’; an idea 
describing social/interests groups competing over space and resources using planning 
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methods and discourse of citizen rights. The Haredim do not bargain but augment their 
potential influence on decision-making. When official allocations are inadequate, the 
group turns into unofficial modes of action to achieve sectorial goals. Conversely, 
secular residents regard themselves as autonomous homeowners. They expect the 
authorities to support their views and demand the policy makers defend what they see 
as their rights and stop sectarian allocation of public resources. The secular residents 
may not be good at organising themselves or prepared to sacrifice individual interests, 
but the rules of the game have been blurred and seem to be rigged against them. 
 
While the Kiryat-Ha’Yovel study suggests that appropriation of territory can be 
considered as a failure of liberalism that couldn't balance public rights according to its 
fundamental agenda, conclusion is equivocal. After all, could planning intervention 
actually change the outcome, enacted in various places on the world stage? And if not - 
will Jerusalem become a network of self-created ghettos within a diminishing pluralist 
population? This process can also be seen as a bottom-up reaction to the changing role 
of the state and public policies in developing cities. In an absence of a shared civil 
society, increasing involvement of interest groups trying to catch some of the power of 
national governments, undermining the institutionalised logic of economics, identities, 
governance and cultural norms. The limited ability of the planning system to protect the 
public interest and guarantee its rights dissolute, causing the system to betray the values 
on which it is based. 
 
To conclude, the dynamic of residential competition could be relevant to many other 
situations, such as separatists Catalans, Scots, Indian states or US cities, where 
differences in lifestyle characterisations may lead to a collision between interest groups. 
Understanding that this is not a local struggle, but part of national ideologies, and 
formulating common rules between communities to engage one another while using 
planning tools, may balance competing interests. Further research may reveal the 
degree to which this is a typical process.  
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Fig. 1: Map of Jerusalem with the Haredim enclaves. (a) Kiryat-Ha’Yovel marked. (b) Kiryat-
Ha’Yovel and the adjacent neighborhoods  
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Fig. 2: Map of Zangwill Street area 
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 Fig. 3a-c: Spatial intervention of Kol-Torah to Zangwill Street 2002, 2004 and 2009 
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Fig. 4: Entry of Kol-Torah residents into apartments on Zangwill St., by year 
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Fig. 5: Average selling price to market price ratio as dependent on the sequential 
number of apartment among those sold by the veteran to Israeli-Lithuanians, for each 
section.  
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Fig. 6: Distribution of population in Kiryat Ha’Yovel, 2009. 
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